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Evidence of bias in the Eurovision song contest: modelling the
votes using Bayesian hierarchical models
Abstract
The Eurovision Song Contest is an annual musical competition held among active
members of the European Broadcasting Union since 1956. The event is televised live
across Europe. Each participating country presents a song and receive a vote based
on a combination of tele-voting and jury. Over the years, this has led to speculations
of tactical voting, discriminating against some participants and thus inducing bias
in the final results. In this paper we investigate the presence of positive or negative
bias (which may roughly indicate favouritisms or discrimination) in the votes based
on geographical proximity, migration and cultural characteristics of the participating
countries through a Bayesian hierarchical model. Our analysis found no evidence of
negative bias, although mild positive bias does seem to emerge systematically, linking
voters to performers.
Key words: Bayesian hierarchical models, ordinal logistic regression, Eurovision
song contest.
2
1 Introduction
The Eurovision Song Contest is an annual musical competition held among active members of the
European Broadcasting Union (EBU). The first edition of the contest was held in 1956 in Lugano
(Switzerland). The event was televised live across Europe, in what represented a highly technological
experiment in broadcasting.
Members of the EBU approved plans to hold the contest on an annual basis and there were initially
seven participating countries: The Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg
and Italy, each entering the competition with two songs. The winner was decided by a jury which
consisted of an equal number of members per participating country.
The voting system in the contest has changed over time. From 1962 onwards, positional voting
was used, eventually leading to the current point system, in which 12, 10, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 points
are allocated to each country’s top 10 favourite songs. The country with the highest score overall is
announced as the winner.
Tele-voting was introduced in 1997 and allowed viewers from participating nations to vote for
their favourite act via phone, email or text. Austria, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom trialled the system, while the rest continued using juries. In 1998 all countries used tele-
voting to determine the points awarded to the top ten preferred acts, and from then onwards all
countries have used this system or a mixture of tele-voting/juries to determine the way in which
points are allocated.
Especially with the introduction of tele-voting, accusations of bias in the voting system have been
brought forward by several commentators. Famously, in 2008 Sir Terry Wogan announced that he
would quit as the BBC’s Eurovision contest commentator after casting doubts over the regularity
of the contest (BBC news website, 2008). Periodically, the media investigate accusations of wrong-
doing in the management of the contest (BBC Panorama, 2012) and the problem of bias and political
influence over the voting system of the Eurovision contest has been also considered in the scientific
literature.
Yair (1995) is probably the first paper addressing the issue of collusive voting behaviour in the
contest; his analysis based on multidimensional social networks showed the presence of three main
“bloc” areas: Western, Mediterranean and Northern, although no detailed statistical assessment was
given of the derived associations among countries attitude towards each other. Clerides and Stengos
(2006) used an econometric model to quantify the impact of factors determining affinity and objective
quality on the actual votes. Their conclusions were that some evidence of reciprocity was found, but
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no strategic voting resulted from the analysis. Fenn et al. (2006) used dynamical network and cluster
models to show that while the existence of “unofficial cliques” of countries is supported by the empirical
evidence, the underlying mechanism for this cannot be fully explained by geographical proximity.
Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2006) investigated how geographical, cultural, linguistic, and religious factors
lead to voting bias using multilevel models and considering the bias of one country towards another
as the dependent variable. Their analysis points to evidence to suggest that geographical and social
factors influence certain countries voting behaviour, although political factors did not seem to play
a role in influencing voting. In a similar vein, Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) argue that determinants
other than political conflicts or friendships, such as linguistic and cultural proximity, seem to be mostly
associated with the observed voting patterns.
All in all, the existing scientific evidence seems to suggest that indeed there are particular voting
patterns that tend to show up more often than not; however, it is less clear whether this can be taken
as definitive proof of the existing of fundamental bias, either in terms of favouritism or discrimination.
In this paper we aim at quantifying the presence of systematic bias in the propensity to vote for a
given performer. We use a Bayesian hierarchical framework to model the score as a function of a
random (structured) effect which depends on cultural and spatial proximity, as well as on migration
stocks. Using this strategy we aim at capturing the possible effects of social as well as geographical
components which might influence the voting patterns. Moreover, we control for some potential
confounder factors, i.e. the year in which the contest was held, the country hosting the contest, the
language in which each song was sung and the type of act (male solo artist, female solo artist or mixed
group).
As we will discuss later, we are not particularly interested in the “effect” of these covariates on
the score associated with a given voter, a given performer and a given occasion. Rather, we use these
to balance the data and account for potentially different baseline characteristics. Nor are we focussed
on predicting the actual votes for next instance of the contest, given them. The main objective of the
paper is to try and identify the impact of the social and geographical structured effect on the voting
patterns and thus, unlike many regression models, the interest of our analysis lies almost exclusively
on the random effects.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the available data and the
variables used in the model; Section 3 specifies the Bayesian framework used for the analysis including
the model fit index used to find the best specification; Section 4 presents the results for the best-fitting
model, and finally Section 5 discusses some issues related to the model.
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2 Data
In this analysis we use data on the final round of votes of the contest during the period 1998-2012
inclusive. This period is selected for pragmatic reasons, since tele-voting was only adopted from 1998
onwards. The data are available from the official Eurovision contest website (www.eurovision.tv).
All countries that have voted in the final round in the period under study have been considered in
our analysis. For each combination of voter, performer and year, the votes are available as an ordinal
categorical variable, which can assume values {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,10,12}.
The available predictors are the following: the language in which each song was sung (the per-
former’s language, English, or a mixture of two or more languages), the gender and the type of
performance (group, solo male artist, solo female artist). We specify the random effects as a function
of data on two dimensions: first we consider the migration stocks, obtained from the World Bank’s
dataset (www.worldbank.org) as a proxy of the migration intensity from the voter’s to the performer’s
country. This is supposed to account for possible favouritism in voting patterns due to the presence
of large stocks of people originally from the performer’s country, but currently living in the voter’s
country. Secondly, we consider the neighbouring structure, defined in terms of the countries sharing
boundaries. This is used to account for similar geographical characteristics.
3 Bayesian modelling
We define the voters as v = 1, . . . , V = 48 and the performers as p = 1, . . . , P = 43 (i.e. our data
contain some countries that vote but do not perform). The outcome of interest is the variable yvpt
representing the points given by voter v to performer p on occasion (year) t = 1, . . . , Tvp. Thus,
yvpt is a categorical variable which can take any of the S = 11 values in the set of scores S =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12}. Note that the number of occasions for the voter-performer pair (Tvp)
can vary between 0 and 15 in the dataset considered. Moreover, because not all the countries have
participated consistently throughout the several editions of the contest, the dataset is not balanced
and therefore the value Tvp does vary with the pair (v, p). In particular, this means that there are
H = 1937 observed combinations of voter-performer pairs.
We then model
yvpt ∼ Categorical(pivpt),
where pivpt = (pivpt1, . . . , pivptS) represents a vector of model probabilities that voter v scores performer
p exactly s ∈ S points on occasion t.
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As mentioned earlier, in addition to the main outcome, we observe some covariates defined at
different levels. Formally, we define:
• The year in which the contest is held as x1t. To simplify the interpretation we actually include in
the model the derived variable representing the difference between the year under consideration
and the first year in the series, x∗1t = x1t− 1998. Including this covariate in the model is helpful
in accounting for external factors, specific to the particular contest, that may have affected the
observed scores;
• The language in which a song is sung as x2pt. This can take on the values 1 = English, 2 = own,
3 = mixed (i.e. a combination of two or more languages);
• The type of performance as x3pt. This can take on the values 1 = Group, 2 = Female solo artist,
or 3 = Male solo artist.
Since x2pt and x3pt are categorical variables, we define suitable dummies x
(c)
lpt for l = 2, 3 and c =
1, . . . Cl, taking value 1 if xlpt = c and 0 otherwise. Thus, C2 = 3 and C3 = 3.
Following standard notation in ordinal regression (McCullagh, 1980; Congdon, 2007; Jackman,
2009), we model the cumulative probabilities ηvpts := Pr(yvpt ≤ s) as
logit(ηvpts) = λs − µvpt, (1)
with the obvious implication that pivpt1 = ηvpt1; pivpts = ηvps − ηvpt(s−1), for s = 2, . . . , S − 1; and
pivptS = 1 − ηvptS . Here, λ = (λ1, . . . , λS) is a set of random cutoff points for the latent continuous
outcome associated with the observed categorical variable. In order to respect the ordering constraint
implicit in the ordinal structure of the data, we model
λ1 ∼ Normal(0, σ
2
λ)I(−∞, λ2),
λ2 ∼ Normal(0, σ
2
λ)I(λ1, λ3),
. . .
λS−1 ∼ Normal(0, σ
2
λ)I(λS−2, λS),
λS ∼ Normal(0, σ
2
λ)I(λS−1,∞).
Assuming a large variance with respect to the scale in which the variables λs are defined (e.g. σ
2
λ = 10)
effectively ensures that the strengh of the prior is not overwhelming in comparison to the evidence
provided by the data. In addition, the linear predictor µvpt is defined as a function of the relevant
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covariates
µvpt = β1x
∗
1t +
C2∑
c=2
β2cx
(c)
2pt +
C3∑
c=2
β3cx
(c)
3t + αvp. (2)
The vector of unstructured (fixed) coefficients is defined as β = (β1,β2,β3), with β2 = (β22, β23) and
β3 = (β32, β33). The elements in β measure the impact of the covariates on the probability that, on
occasion t, performer p receives a vote in S from voter v. We consider as reference categories the values
English for x
(c)
2pt, and Group for x
(c)
3pt. As is clear from (1), the model is set up under a proportional
odds assumption, i.e. that the effect of the predictors is constant across the ordered categories. The
negative sign in (1) helps with the interpretation of the β coefficients: larger coefficients are associated
with higher probability of a higher score.
We specify independent and minimally informative Normal priors for the unstructured coefficients
β ∼ Normal(m,Q)
where m is a vector of zeros of length B =
(
1 +
∑3
l=2 Cl
)
= 5 (i.e. the length of the vector β) and
Q = q2IB is a (B ×B) diagonal covariance matrix with q = 10
4.
3.1 Modelling the structured effect αvp
The coefficient αvp is the parameter of main interest in our analysis and it represents a structured
(random) effect, accounting for clustering at the voter-performer level, which is implied by the fact
that we observe repeated instances of the voting pattern from country v towards country p, over the
years.
We use a formulation
αvp ∼ Normal(θvp, σ
2
α),
where the mean is specified as
θvp = γ + δRvp + ψwvp + φzvpI(zvp). (3)
Here, the coefficient γ represents the overall intercept; the covariate wvp takes value 1 if countries
v and p share a geographic border and 0 otherwise; and the covariate zvp represents an estimate
of the migration intensity from country v to country p. Thus, ψ is the “geographic” effect and φ
is the “migration” effect. Notice that, by design, if there is no recorded migration from v to p we
automatically set this effect to 0.
In addition, we assume that voters implicitly cluster in K “regions”; this accounts for similarities
in voters’ propensity towards the performers, over and above the geographic and migratory aspects
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defined above. For example, because of “cultutral” proximity, countries in the Former Soviet bloc
may have the same attitude towards one of the performers p, regardless of whether they are close
geographically or the amount of migration from p. For each voter we define a latent categorical
variable Rv which can take values 1, 2, . . . ,K (for a fixed upper bound K), i.e. Rv ∼ Categorical(ζ),
where ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζK) is the vector of probabilities that each voter belongs in each of the clusters. We
use a minimally informative Dirichlet prior on ζ. Consequently, the coefficients δkp (for k = 1, . . . ,K)
represent a set of structured common residual for each combination of macro-area and performer,
which we use to describe the “cultural” effect.
We model the parameters in the linear predictor for θvp using the following specification: γ, ψ
and φ are given independent minimally informative Normal distributions (centred on 0 and with large
variance), while δkp are given an exchangeable structure
δkp ∼ Normal(0, σ
2
δ ).
The two structured variances are given independent minimally informative prior on the log standard
deviation scale
log(σα), log(σδ)
iid
∼ Uniform(−3, 3).
Since the priors for both σα and σδ are defined on the log scale, a range of (−3, 3) is in fact reasonably
large and thus these distributions do not imply strict prior constraints on the range of the variability.
Sensitivity analyses upon varying the scale of the Uniform distributions have confirmed that the results
are generally insensitive to this aspect of the modelling.
The coefficients αvp have an interesting interpretation: consider two voters v1 and v2 and one
performer p; for each fixed score s, αv1p and αv2p determine the difference in the estimated probability
that either voter would score the performer at most s points, ηvpts, all other covariates being equal
(notice that, in our model, none of them depend on the voter anyway). In fact, it easily follows from
(1) and (2) that, if αv1p > αv2p, for any possible score s the chance that v1 scores p more than s
points is greater than the chance that v2 will.
In this sense, we can use the coefficients αvp to quantify the presence of “favoritism” or “dis-
crimination” between specific countries. Estimated values of αvp substantially below 0 indicate that
voter v tends to systematically underscore performer p, while values substantially above 0 suggest a
systematic pattern in which v scores p higher votes than other voters. Of course, we cannot grant a
causal interpretation to this analysis: the acts of favouritism or discrimination imply some deliberate
intervention, which we are not able to capture from our data. Nevertheless, we can interpret the
estimated values for αvp as at least indicative of the underlying voting patterns.
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3.2 Estimation procedure
The posterior distributions for the parameters of interest are obtained through a MCMC simulation,
implemented in WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter et al., 1996; Lunn et al., 2012), which we have integrated
within R using the library R2WinBUGS (Sturtz et al., 2005) − the code to run the model is available
on request. Since the model is relatively computationally intensive, we used the R library snowfall,
which allows multicore computation. The results are based on 2 chains. For each, we considered 11 000
iterations following 1 000 burnin; in addition we thinned the chains selecting one iteration every 20.
Convergence to the relevant posterior distributions has been checked visually through traceplots
and density plots, as well as analytically through the Gelman Rubin diagnostic (Gelman and Rubin,
1992) and the analysis of autocorrelation and the effective sample size.
4 Results
We tested three different versions of our model, upon varying the number of possible “regions” in
which the voters can cluster. We tried values of K = 3, 4, 5 and compared the resulting models using
the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC, Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). The preferred model is the one
with 4 regions (DIC = 36 832, while the models with 3 and 5 components have DIC = 36 868 and DIC
= 36 844, respectively).
Figure 1 shows the posterior probability that each voter belongs in one of the 4 clusters. We have
labelled them as “1”, “2”, “3” and “4” (they appear in Figure 1 in increasing shades of grey, i.e.
region “1” is the lightest and region “4” the darkest).
Countries in the former Yugoslavia (notice that because of political changes occurred during the
period considered, Serbia and Montenegro are present both as a single country and separately) are
clearly clustered in region “1”, where also Switzerland and Austria tend to feature. This can be
explained by their close geographical proximity with the Balkans as well as possible migrations after
the 1990’s war. Region “2” is mainly composed by voters in central and southern Europe, but curiously
countries such as Bulgaria and Romania tend to cluster in this group, too. This is possibly due to
illegal migrations, especially from Romania towards countries such as Spain or Italy. In addition,
countries such as Turkey and Albania show a large propensity of clustering in this region. Regions
“3” and “4” show a lower degree of separation and tend to include countries in the Former Soviet bloc
(mainly in region “4”) and countries in northern Europe (specifically Scandinavian countries as well
as the UK and Ireland). This result is overall in line with the findings of Yair (1995).
Table 1 shows the posterior mean and 95% credibility interval for the unstructured effects from the
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Figure 1: Posterior probability that each voter belongs in one of the 4 regions. The lightest shade
of grey indicates the cluster (region) labelled as “1”, while increasingly darker shades of grey in-
dicate regions “2”, “3” and “4”, respectively. Countries are labelled using their ISO country code,
as follows: BIH=Bosnia and Herzegovina; HRV=Croatia; MKD=Macedonia; MNE=Montenegro;
SVN=Slovenia; CHE=Switzerland; SCG=Serbia and Montenegro; AUT=Austria; SRB=Serbia;
ALB=Albania; SVK=Slovakia; TUR=Turkey; MCO=Monaco; ITA=Italy; BEL=Belgium;
FRA=France; DEU=Germany; NLD=Netherlands; ROU=Romania; AZE=Azerbaijan; ESP=Spain;
SMR=San Marino; BGR=Bulgaria; GEO=Georgia; CYP=Cyprus; MDA=Moldova; ISR=Israel;
PRT=Portugal; SWE=Sweden; NOR=Norway; DNK=Denmark; AND=Andorra; FIN=Finland;
RUS=Russia; CZE=Czech Republic; GRC=Greece; MLT=Malta; ARM=Armenia; EST=Estonia;
HUN=Hungary; ISL=Iceland; IRE=Ireland; LVA=Latvia; LTU=Lithuania; POL=Poland;
GBR=United Kingdom; UKR=Ukraine; BLR=Belarus
regression model. We re-iterate that these are not the main interest of the analysis and are included in
the model primarily to adjust for potential unbalance in the background characteristics of every voting
occasion. Nevertheless, it is possible to see that the analysis of β2 suggests that performers singing
in their own language are generally scored lower than those singing in English. Also from the results
for the coefficients in β3 it appears that female solo artists tend to get higher scores than group
performances. Both the unstructured geographic effect and migration effect seem to be positively
associated with higher scores. Performing countries tend to be scored highly by their neighbours and
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Coefficient (variable) Mean 95% Credible interval
β1 (Year) –0.034 –0.044 –0.023
β22 (Mixed language)
a –0.062 –0.066 –0.194
β32 (Own language)
a –0.131 –0.255 –0.010
β32 (Solo female artist)
b –0.232 –0.131 –0.328
β33 (Solo male artist)
b –0.067 –0.170 –0.034
ψ (Geographic effect) –1.210 –0.996 -1.430
φ (Migration effect) –0.101 –0.076 –0.126
a Reference: English
b Reference: Group artist
Table 1: Summary of the posterior distributions for the ustructured effects of the regression model
by countries where their population tend to migrate.
More interestingly, for each pair (v, p), we can analyse the structured effects αvp, describing the
systematic components in the voting patterns. In order to make the results comparable on the same
scale, we standardised them, i.e. we centred them around the observed grand mean and divided by
the observed overall standard deviation, e.g.
α∗vp =
αvp − α¯
sα
,
with
α¯ =
V∑
v=1
P∑
p=1
αvp
H
and sα =
V∑
v=1
P∑
p=1
(αvp − α¯)
2
H − 1
.
Standardisation of the coefficients makes it easier to select some arbitrary thresholds above or
below which the effect can be considered to be “substantial”, therefore indicating the presence of
bias. Since, as confirmed by the analysis of the posterior distributions (not shown), the αvp are
reasonably normally distributed, we consider a threshold of ±1.96. Thus, values of α∗vp > 1.96 suggest
positive bias (“favouritism”) from v to p, while values of α∗vp < −1.96 are indicative of negative bias
(“discrimination”) from v against p.
The analysis of the entire distributions for the α∗vp confirms the absence of clear negative bias
throughout the set of voters and performers. In other words, no evidence is found to support the
hypothesis that one of the voters systematically “discriminates” against one of the performers. On
the other hand, some patterns of positive bias do emerge from the analysis. This is evident from
Figure 2: for each of the H voter-performer combinations, the solid circles represent the posterior
probability of a positive bias: Pr(α∗vp > 1.96 | y), while the open circles are the posterior probability
of a negative bias: Pr(α∗vp < −1.96 | y). As is possible to see, the latter never exceeds 0.75.
Figure 3 shows a representation of the posterior distributions of the α∗vp for four selected performers.
The wide variability in the range of the distributions is driven by the fact that the data are unbalanced,
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Figure 2: Posterior probability that the standardised structured effects exceed the thresholds ±1.96:
The open circles ◦ in the bottom part of the graph indicate Pr(α∗vp < −1.96 | y), which represents
discrimination from v to p, while the solid circles • in the top part of the graph indicate Pr(α∗vp >
1.96 | y), which describes positive bias from v to p
i.e. not all the countries compete in every year under investigation. Therefore, the estimation of the
coefficient for some of the combinations of voter-performer may be based on only a few instances, thus
inducing wide variability — e.g. Italy in Figure 3(c).
The voting patterns towards Sweden show a clear absence of any systematic negative bias, since
no distribution is entirely below zero, let alone the threshold of −1.96. Many of the countries that are
closely related to Sweden either geographically or culturally (most notably, Denmark, Norway and
Finland) are associated with higher propensity to score the Swedish act higher points. The distribution
for Denmark is nearly all above the threshold of 1.96, indicating a potential positive bias.
The analysis for other performers show also interesting behaviours: for example, Greece seems to
be substantially favoured by its close neighbours Cyprus (for which similarity is geographic as well as
cultural) and Albania. Moreover, there is a very large set of voters for which the entire distribution
of α∗vp is completely above 0, while no distribution is completely below 0. This indicates a general
positive attitude towards Greece, which may be fostered by widespread migrations across Europe.
At the other end of the spectrum, the voting patterns towards Albania are characterised by a large
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number of voters showing a distribution entirely below 0. While none exceeds the “discrimination
threshold” of −1.96, this seems to suggest very low popularity among the voters. Neighbouring
countries such as Macedonia and Montenegro have higher propensities to vote for Albania, but these
are not substantial (i.e. they are never greater than the “favouritism threshold” of 1.96).
Finally, Turkey seems to be substantially favoured in Germany — possibly due to the large number
of Turkish migrants living in (and potentially tele-voting from) Germany. A few other distributions
are entirely above 0; for many of those the same migration arguments can be brought forward, while
for Azerbaijan there probably are cultural similarities that increase the propensity to vote for Turkey.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have tried to seek empirical evidence of systematic bias in the Eurovision contest
voting. In particular, we have tried to disentangle the two possible extreme behaviours of negative
(which may be indicative of “discrimination”) and positive bias (which possibly suggests “favourit-
ism”), defined in terms of tail probabilities.
We have used a hierarchical structure to account for correlation induced in repeated instances
of the same voter-performer pattern, which occur over time. This by necessity causes shrinkage in
the estimations; on the one hand, this potentially limits the ability to identify extreme behaviours.
However, on the other hand, because in some cases the sample size observed for a given combination
of voter-performer is very small, the hierarchical structure is necessary to avoid unstable estimates
for the propensity to vote. In addition, shrinkage is likely to occur on both ends of the distributions;
in our results, we are able to identify some examples of “favouritism”, but no real “discrimination”
occurs (according to our criteria). Thus, it is reasonable to assume that shrinkage does not impact
dramatically on our ability to detect bias.
After having considered some potentially unbalancing factors, we have structured the propensity
to vote for a given performer as a function of several components, designed to capture geographic,
population movements and cultural effects. The latter has been obtained through a clustering model
of the voters embedded in the Bayesian formulation and based on the assumption that voters in
the same cultural cluster tend to share similar attitudes towards a given performer. The resulting
allocation of voters to the clusters is often consistent with prior expectation about geographical and
historical circumstances (e.g. the countries in the Former Yugoslavia tend to clearly cluster together).
However, because the procedure is mainly data-driven, we gain in flexibility, for example with respect
to conditionally autoregressive structures, in modelling spatial correlation.
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(b) Greece
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(c) Albania
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Figure 3: The dots represent the posterior means of the structured effects α∗vp, indicating for each
voter v the propensity to vote for performer p: United Kingdom (top-left corner), Greece (top-right),
Albania (bottom-left) and Turkey (bottom-right). Dark and light lines indicate the 50% and 95%
credibility intervals, respectively
A related point consists the number of “regions” that we have used in the clustering procedure.
For simplicity, we have assumed that this was fixed, although we have tested several alternatives to
capture the heterogeneity within European nations (for example, to acknowledge the presence of at
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least four distinct macro-areas: the Former Soviet bloc, Former Yugoslavia, Scandinavia and the rest
of Europe).
In conclusion, the findings from our model seem to suggest that no real negative bias emerges in
the tele-voting — in fact, no substantial negative bias occurs across all the combinations of voters-
performers. In some cases (and in accordance with previous findings in the literature), we found
moderate to substantial positive bias, which could be explained by strong “cultural” similarites, e.g.
due to commonalities in language and history, and to a lesser extent to geographical proximity and
migrations. Our formulation highlights the power of Bayesian hierarchical models in dealing with
complex data, allowing to properly account for the underlying correlation among the observed data
and, possibly, at the higher levels of the assumed structure.
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